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ARTICLES
PROTECTING DUE PROCESS AND CIVIC
FRIENDSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Thomas P. Huff*
When the grey-eyed goddess Athena seeks to prepare the
young boy Tel6makhos to join his father Odysseus's return to
Ithaka, she sends him to visit Pylos, home of Nestor, and to
Lakedaimon to meet Menelfos and Helen. There, she quite
rightly expects, he can discover directly how the Trojan War
came about and thus come to appreciate why his father has been
absent through much of his youth. As Homer tells it, Tel6makhos
enters upon these visits with a certain understandable shyness.
"How," he asks, "can I do it, how approach [them]? I have no
practice in elaborate speeches, and for a young man to interrogate
an old man seems disrespectful." But, as Athena knows, the
Akhaian traditions ensure that a young man like Tel6makhos will
be given the fullest opportunity to tell his story. Among other
things the atmosphere will be made right-no visitors are ever
asked who they are or what they have to say until they have had
an opportunity to bathe and eat a full meal, and the host is ex-
pected to approach the persons and the stories about to be told
free of preconceptions or prejudice.
Tel6makhos, of course, discovers that these traditions make
it possible for him to speak fully, freely, and eloquently about his
search for his father and about the situation in Ithaka-more
than a hundred suitors for the hand of his mother, Penelope, are
eating him out of house and home. He also discovers that his
speeches, in turn, evoke in his hosts equally eloquent tales of his
father's honor and of the events of the Trojan War. In the end
Tel6makhos decides to return to Ithaka to take action, and Nes-
tor, Menelfos, and Helen respond in his support with gifts and
advice.1
In the last ten years the United States Supreme Court has de-
veloped a considerable body of law regarding what process is due
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Montana: B.A., University of Colorado, 1964;
Ph.D., Rice University, 1968. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Cynthia
Schuster, Richard Walton, Carl Tobias, and the editors of the Montana Law Review, and
the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, but accepts sole responsibility
for the content of this article.
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in adjudicating claims to various types of government benefits. Un-
fortunately, as many commentators have noticed, the Court's rea-
soning has created substantial doctrinal difficulties.2 The first part
of this article reviews several of the opinions that have led to these
problems and argues that the Court's current approach to claims
to government benefits is unsatisfactory. The second part of the
article is considerably more speculative. It attempts, by drawing on
the insights of the Tel6makhos story, to explain how some of the
issues that arise in the adjudication of claims to government bene-
fits are symptomatic of difficulties in the organization of our civic
life. What is attempted in Part II is inevitably somewhat general
and incomplete, but the issues are now ripe for discussion and re-
quire for their understanding examination of the role legislatures
and administrative agencies play in determining the quality of our
civic life.
PART I: PROTECTING DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Background
In 1964, Charles Reich's seminal article The New Property
helped set the stage for an expansion of the interests that could
invoke the requirements of due process.3 Reich argued that govern-
ment had emerged in the preceding two decades as "a major source
of wealth":
The valuables dispensed by government take many forms,
but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the
place of traditional forms of wealth-forms which are held as pri-
vate property. . . . Increasingly, Americans live on government
largess-allocated by government on its own terms, and held by
recipients subject to conditions which express the "public
interest."4
Reich aptly described the growing interests of individuals in gov-
ernment largess as a new kind of property. He was particularly
2. See, e.g., Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 89; Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Ad-
ministrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw]; Van Alstyne, Cracks in
"The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 445 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
3. Reich, The New Property, 73 YAIz L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Reich].
This is noted by Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 452-55 and L. TRImE, AMERICAN CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 514-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIE].
4. Reich, supra note 3, at 733.
5. Id., passim.
[Vol. 42
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concerned that constraints be imposed upon the exercise of gov-
ernment discretion in the modification of the interests of individu-
als in this new property, lest these interests come to resemble
those of a feudal tenant-subject to any sort of change in the al-
leged interest of the landlord state. Consequently, Reich made the
following recommendation:
Because it is so hard to confine relevance and discretion, pro-
cedure offers a valuable means for restraining arbitrary action.
This was recognized in the strong procedural emphasis of the Bill
of Rights, and it is being recognized in the increasingly procedu-
ral emphasis of administrative law. The law of government largess
has developed with little regard for procedure. Reversal of this
trend is long overdue. 7
Prior to the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had held a quite
different view. It found that procedural due process was required
whenever government action seemingly conflicted with substan-
tive individual rights protected either by a constitutional guaran-
tee more specific than due process or by "those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England before the emigration of our ancestors."8
During much of this early period an explicit part of the
Court's view of due process was that while constitutional rights
and common law interests could be protected against direct state
action, the state was free to withhold or to condition the privileges
it granted, such as employment, upon compliance with restrictions
that would have otherwise violated constitutional and common law
interests. As Justice Holmes expressed it, "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman."' Thus, state-granted privileges
were not attended by normal due process protections.10 By the late
1960s, however, this distinction between rights and privileges was
breaking down." Public sector interests had become so pervasive
and important that individuals sought procedural protections for
these interests comparable to the protections previously accorded
6. Id. at 769-70.
7. Id. at 783.
8. TRmE, supra note 3, at 507 (quoting in part Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927)).
9. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
10. TamE, supra note 3, at 509-10.
11. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972). See generally Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv.
1439, 1445-58 (1968).
1981]
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constitutional rights and common law interests.
Due Process for the New Property: Goldberg v. Kelly"
In the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the changes which had occurred in the relationships
between persons and government by requiring that an evidentiary
hearing be held before welfare benefits could be terminated. Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Brennan said:
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more
like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in
this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within tradi-
tional common-law concepts of property."
The Court found that the degree of procedural protection af-
forded the interests of a person in these new property rights must
be ascertained "by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss,' and depends upon whether the recipient's in-
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs governmental interest in
summary adjudication."14 Because termination of a statutory enti-
tlement affects important property-like interests, the methods by
which termination may be accomplished must satisfy the require-
ments of constitutional due process. The adequacy of those proce-
dures is determined by balancing the quality of the interest con-
veyed in the entitlement against the government's need for
efficiency and economy. The more important the interest to the
individual, the more elaborate must be the procedural protections.
Notwithstanding the nature of the interest, however, the govern-
ment's need for efficiency and economy must be considered in as-
certaining the precise protections.
Goldberg's Progeny
The Court expanded upon and developed this approach in two
different types of cases decided subsequent to Goldberg. First, the
Court treated interests in liberty created by statute. In Morrissey
v. Brewer,15 the Court considered the process due prior to parole
revocation. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, initially
stated that "revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecu-
tion and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a
12. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13. Id. at 262 n.8.
14. Id. at 263 (quoting in part Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
15. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
[Vol. 42
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proceeding does not apply. ... "1 He then added that if the indi-
vidual will be "'condemned to suffer grievous loss',117 and if the
"interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or prop-
erty' language of the Fourteenth Amendment," 8 then the Court
will determine whether the procedural protection afforded meets
the demands of the particular situation.'9 Because the Court found
revocation of parole to be the loss of an important-though statu-
torily created-liberty, the Justices held that "[i]ts termination
calls for some orderly process, however informal."2
In a second type of case the Court examined procedural re-
quirements for dismissal of public employees. In Board of Regents
v. Roth,"1 the Court suggested that interests in government em-
ployment could be treated as property interests in a maner analo-
gous to the treatment of public assistance in Goldberg.22 But be-
cause the Court found that Roth had no interest whatever in re-
employment-his employment contract being for one year
only-he was left without procedural protections."
In the companion case of Perry v. Sindermann,24 the Court
spoke more explicitly of property interests in government
employment:
We have made clear in Roth that "property" interests subject
to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few
rigid, technical forms. Rather, "property" denotes a broad range
of interests that are secured by "existing rules or
understandings."'-
Sindermann did not have explicit tenure provisions in his employ-
ment contract, but it appeared that there might be mutual under-
standings suggesting a de facto tenure policy. The Court stated
that absence of "an explicit contractual provision may not always
foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a 'property' interest in
16. Id. at 480.
17. Id. at 481 (quoting in part Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
18. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 482. The Court held that an informal pretermination hearing must be pro-
vided, specifying in some detail when and how that hearing should be conducted.
21. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. Id. at 571-72, 576-78. It becomes clear in the succeeding employment cases, dis-
cussed infra, that certain members of the Court viewed differently property interests in
employment. See notes 35 and 38 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 578-79.
24. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
25. Id. at 601 (citations omitted).
1981]
5
Huff: Protecting Due Process
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
re-employment."' 6 If an implied interest were found, that would
not, of course, entitle [the employee] to reinstatement. But such
proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his re-
quest, where he could be informed of the grounds for his non-
retention and challenge their sufficiency.2 7
Consequently, the Court remanded the case for consideration of
whether Sindermann had such an implied property interest. The
Court did not explicitly find a property interest in government em-
ployment either in this case or in Roth; however, both opinions
suggested that if such interests were found, constitutional due pro-
cess protections would be required.
In summary, the reasoning applied in these cases appeared
straightforward, if not explicit. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments speak of deprivations "of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." Statutorily created interests in welfare and
parole and interests in government employment are liberty and
property interests. Therefore these interests are entitled to the
protections of procedural due process provided in these
Amendments.
A Problem Arises: Arnett v. Kennedy28
By the mid-1970s, members of the Court began to disagree
about the implications of Roth and Sindermann. In Arnett v. Ken-
nedy the Court addressed the claim of a non-probationary civil
service employee who had been dismissed under the procedures of
the Civil Service Acts.2" Those procedures provided in part for the
removal of non-probationary employees "for such cause as will pro-
mote the efficiency of the service. ' ' 0 They required that the em-
ploying agency only give written notice of intent to remove and
that it send a copy of the charges to the employee to which he or
she might respond in writing. 1 Claiming a right to a trial-type
hearing, Kennedy had refused to file any response to the charges
against him.82 After notice from his superior of his dismissal, Ken-
26. Id.
27. Id. at 603.
28. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1976).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1976).
31. Under the civil service procedures, the agency was not required to provide a hear-
ing or the opportunity to examine witnesses. Appellee Kennedy had been dismissed from his
position with the Office of Economic Opportunity for allegedly stating, "in reckless disre-
gard of the actual facts," that his superior attempted to bribe a representative of a commu-
nity action organization. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 137.
32. Id. at 137-38.
[Vol. 42
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nedy filed suit in district court.
In a plurality opinion Justice Rehnquist exposed the source of
disagreement." He found that "[w]here the grant of a substantive
right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the proce-
dures which are to be employed in determining that right, a liti-
gant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet." 4 In other words, if the Court is going to recognize "prop-
erty" interests in government employment agreements it also must
recognize the procedural limitations explicit in those agreements as
provided by statute. According to Rehnquist, Kennedy's interest in
his civil service job should not elicit more procedural protection
than was provided in the Civil Service Acts as they applied to his
position. Interests in government employment may be qualified
procedurally in employment contracts at the government's
discretion.
Though a majority of the Court disagreed with the Rehnquist
plurality on this issue, a problem With "new property" due process
was now apparent. 5 The Justices disagreed over precisely how to
treat procedurally qualified employment interests. Is the right to
procedural due process in employment new property cases con-
ferred exclusively by contract, or do constitutional due process re-
quirements extend to the grant of all legislative entitlements?
33. Id. at 136-64 (opinion joined by Burger, C.J. and Stewart, J.).
34. Id. at 153-54.
35. Justice Powell, who had not participated in the Roth and Sindermann decisions,
was joined by Justice Blackmun, who voted with the majority in Roth and Sindermann, in
dissenting on this issue:
The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's interest
in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statu-
tory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural
due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against arbitrary or er-
roneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plural-
ity would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment deter-
mines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but also the extent of
the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this
approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in Roth and Sindermann.
Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature of an
individual's statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest
could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view miscon-
ceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred,
not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without ap-
propriate procedural safeguards.
416 U.S. at 166-67 (footnotes omitted). Justice White also dissents from the plurality opin-
ion, employing essentially the same argument that Powell uses. Id. at 177-86.
36. See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 460-66.
7
Huff: Protecting ue Process
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
Arnett's Progeny
In Bishop v. Wood,87 an employment case decided after Ar-
nett, a majority of the Court followed the Rehnquist line of reason-
ing."8 Bishop, an employee of the police department of Marion,
N.C., had been discharged without a hearing. The Court affirmed
the district court's interpretation of the city's personnel ordinance.
The trial court had found that the city had provided the peti-
tioner, though officially designated a permanent employee, with lit-
tle more procedural protection than notice of termination and a
statement of reasons for termination. The Court then sustained
use of that procedure, despite the fact that the very same ordi-
nance implied that petitioner, as a permanent employee, was sub-
ject to dismissal only for certain kinds of cause. As Justice White
states in dissent:
The right to his job apparently given by the first two sentences of
the ordinance is thus redefined, according to the majority [of the
Court], by the procedures provided for in the third sentence and
as redefined is infringed only if the procedures are not followed.
This is precisely the reasoning which is embraced by only
three and expressly rejected by six Members of this Court in Ar-
nett v. Kennedy."9
In cases decided after Arnett, involving interests other than
employment, the Court does not use the Rehnquist line of reason-
ing. During the same term in which Bishop was decided, the Court,
37. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
38. Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J. were now joined by Stevens, J. and
Powell, J. White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. continued to
dissent:
The views now expressed by the majority [in Bishop] are thus squarely con-
trary to the views expressed by a majority of the Justices in Arnett. As Mr. Jus-
tice Powell suggested in Arnett, they are also "incompatible with the principles
laid down in Roth and Sindermann." I would not so soon depart from these cases
nor from the views expressed by a majority in Arnett. The ordinance plainly
grants petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire him. Having
granted him such a right it is the Federal Constitution, not state law, which deter-
mines the process to be applied in connection with any state decision to deprive
him of it.
Id. at 360-61 (footnotes and citations omitted).
39. Id. at 357. The ordinance reads:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of
time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his
work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to
the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or
unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any dis-
charged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the
effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such notice.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
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in Mathews v. Eldridge,'40 addressed the sufficiency of the proce-
dures required by the Social Security Act prior to termination of
disability benefits-specifically whether a pretermination hearing
was required. The Court could have responded with the entitle-
ment-qualified-by-procedure argument employed in Bishop, but
instead independently considered the sufficiency of the procedures.
Indeed, the Court relied upon the reasoning applied in
Goldberg-that the importance of the statutory entitlement to its
holder must be balanced against the probability for error in the
specified procedure and the state's interests in minimizing its pro-
cedural costs:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedu-
ral requirement would entail. 41
The Court, sustaining procedures that did not include hearing re-
quirements, distinguished Goldberg on the ground that the loss of
disability benefits was a far less grievous loss than the loss of basic
welfare benefits.42
The formula provided by the Court in Mathews appeared to
be an attempt to consolidate the issues and principles developed in
Goldberg. It appeared inconsistent with the reasoning of the plu-
rality in Arnett and that of the majority in Bishop. Under the Ma-
thews formula, statutory entitlements may be qualified by proce-
dures specified in the act granting the entitlements provided that
these procedures balance properly the state's interests in efficiency
against the interests of the entitlement holder in fairness and accu-
racy. The more important the latter interest the more sophisti-
cated must be the procedural protections. In Bishop, to the con-
trary, the Court treated employment interests as qualified by
whatever procedures were specified in the pertinent statues with-
out an independent judicial determination of the appropriateness
of the balance struck between state and individual interests. In a
40. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
41. Id. at 335.
42. Mashaw argues that the Court does not adequately evaluate the respective inter-
ests in Mathews, and thus fails even to perform the balancing analysis correctly. Mashaw,
supra note 2, at 37-46.
1981]
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later case involving procedural protections afforded when revoking
driver's licenses43 the Court cites with approval the Mathews
formula, but neither distinguishes nor overturns Bishop or Arnett.
Part of the reason Bishop and Arnett are not distinguished from
cases in which the Mathews formula is used is that they cannot be
distinguished. As the next three sections will explain, these cases,
at bottom, all rest on the same faulty premise.
New Property Interests in Public Assistance: The Mathews
Formula
Reich noticed fifteen years ago that individual citizens were
becoming increasingly dependent upon the government for provi-
sion of the economic wherewithal to carry out their lives. They
were employed by government or dependent upon government for
basic income in the form of welfare or disability benefits, or they
conducted important aspects of their economic lives under govern-
ment licenses and regulation. As a consequence, citizens had be-
come increasingly vulnerable to precisely that kind of disappoint-
ment which traditional systems of ownership of private property
and private wealth were meant to prevent. After all, private prop-
erty rights had guarded "the troubled boundary between individ-
ual man and the state"' 44 by providing individuals with private
control over the means necessary to carry out their lives, and due
process protections for these rights had assured that the expecta-
tions of persons with respect to the exercise of these rights would
not be disappointed by arbitrary or capricious state action. Reich's
suggestion was that the interests in government largess be treated
in a manner analogous to traditional property rights in order that
they be afforded comparable, extensive procedural due process
protections.
When the Court first adopted Reich's suggestion with respect
to interests in public assistance, however, it misfocused the ques-
tion. Instead of asking in Goldberg whether a property interest had
been created and then requiring full procedural protections, the
Court sought to balance the extent of the loss to be sustained by
the entitlement holder against the burdens upon government of
costly and time consuming procedures. Because the loss in
Goldberg was great, full protections were indeed provided, but the
procedure used by the Court to reach this result was flawed. Inter-
ests in public assistance benefits are certainly not traditional com-
43. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
44. Reich, supra note 3, at 733.
[Vol. 42
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mon law property rights, but the role they play in the lives of re-
cipients was recognized by the Court to be analogous to the role
private property rights play in the lives of other citizens. Full pro-
cedural protections, analogous to those which protect this interest
in traditional forms of property, should therefore have been re-
quired in order to show a minimum respect for the rights of per-
sons who receive public assistance benefits. To do otherwise would
have permitted government to place these persons' lives on a pe-
rennially contingent basis not unlike those of manorial tenants.
Thus, in ascertaining procedural protections to be accorded
property interests in public assistance designated as property in-
terests, the Court should not have balanced state versus private
interest, but rather should have treated these interests as property
interests and required that they be accorded full procedural pro-
tections. This seems especially compelling in public assistance
cases, because the interest-holders generally have relatively little
political and economic power.
The point made here rests on the general principle that a state
which takes seriously the rights of individual persons, must not
balance rights and their procedural protections against the general
welfare. If the interests of persons in public assistance are taken to
be property rights-rights traditionally taken seriously-then they
should be understood as limiting the pursuit of the general wel-
fare.45 This means in part that these rights should be terminated
only after full procedural protections have been afforded regardless
of the costs to the general welfare.
New Property Interests in Public Employment: Arnett and
Bishop
When a government employment opportunity is offered, it is
normally offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. The prospective
employee is rarely able to negotiate employment terms in the usual
sense. Both Kennedy and Bishop had acquired employment posi-
tions that were designated permanent. Consequently it is reasona-
ble to assume that their lives had become conditioned upon expec-
tations that they would continue to remain employed. This meant
that they would not need to be concerned that their supervisors
might take arbitrary or capricious action against them. What is
wrong with the plurality opinion in Arnett and the majority opin-
ion in Bishop is the failure to recognize that if these interests in
45. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RGHTS SERIOUSLY, 184-205 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as DWORKIN].
1981]
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government employment are taken to be property interests they,
too, should be accorded full procedural protections.
When government exercises power over the lives of persons,
that power ought, by our traditions of limited and determinate
government power, be exercised with the utmost care and discre-
tion. Government employment of any type-not just that explic-
itly designated as permanent-should be recognized as conveying a
property interest, and consequently, should be given the full proce-
dural protection typical of such interests. Sindermann had reason
to expect his job to continue. The Court properly insisted that if
he did, indeed, have an implied contractual interest in continued
employment, then he could not be fired without full process. Roth
expected to have his contract renewed. 46 However, he no doubt
recognized that a variety of legitimate reasons could be given for
termination of his employment at the completion of his first one-
year contract. Due process in his case requires that he have the
opportunity to examine and contest those reasons. As Justice Mar-
shall notes in his dissent in Roth, this will not "place an intolerable
burden on the machinery of government. [For] it is not burden-
some to give reasons when reasons exist. . . .It is only where the
government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly
burdensome. ' '47
Due Process for the New Property
If government, in granting public assistance or in offering em-
ployment, exercises substantial power over the lives of persons,
then that power ought to be exercised carefully. At a minimum,
new property adjudication should proceed as follows: First, all em-
ployment with government should be terminated only for reasons
that are clearly explained and after the employee has the opportu-
nity to contest their legitimacy and truth. Second, where public
assistance provides substantial financial support, that support
should terminate only after reasons have been presented and hear-
ing opportunities have been provided. These rules of adjudication
are appropriate because individuals should not have to worry
about agents of the state pulling the rug out from under their lives
by taking away important sources of income or support. Indeed,
part of the appeal of the Court's use of the "grievous loss" test in
Goldberg, and in the Mathews formula, is that it acknowledges, if
46. The Court pejoratively describes this interest as "an abstract concern." Roth, 408
U.S. at 578.
47. Id. at 591.
[Vol. 42
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only implicitly, the disruption of an interest that is analogous to a
property right interest. Due process protects against disruption of
such interests by making state action more orderly and consistent
and subject to challenge.
What is problematic about the Mathews formula is that it ap-
pears to invite a balancing of the government's interests against
the individual's in determining what protections there shall be.
This contravenes the notion of a property-right claim. Indeed, con-
sideration of "the Government's interest, including. . fiscal and
administrative burdens '48 is, in the context of these cases, mis-
taken. If the procedural protections for the new property interests
are to be more than something casually determined by an appeal
to the "public interest," then these interests must be treated like
traditional property rights. To take the lives of individual persons
seriously, as the due process ideal has traditionally attempted to
do, is to recognize their lives as not always subject to balancing on
the scale of public convenience and thus not always a means to the
collective ends of society.'
But, why should the Court have been attracted by a formula
like that used in Mathews or tempted to read the Bishop employ-
ment ordinance as it does? The reason is that the Court was un-
sure that these interests should be treated like property rights.
The Mathews formula is the correct sort of formula to use in inter-
preting a statute when no right-like interest is at stake, just as the
Court's reading of the Bishop ordinance is a standard interpreta-
tion of an employment contract.
In public assistance cases, use of the Mathews formula raises
questions that a legislature or an administrative agency should
have considered, viz, whether the procedural requirements neces-
sary for the protection of proposed public assistance entitlements
would be too costly. By using the Mathews formula in its decision-
making in these cases, the Court is denying precisely what is im-
portant, viz, that if the entitlement is a property right, then a bal-
ance should not be struck between the individual's interest in
retaining the entitlement, and the public's interest in inexpensive
adjudication. In the employment cases, the Court similarly as-
sumes that a fair bargain has been struck in the contract of em-
ployment, and therefore, that the normal principles of contract in-
terpretation apply. The point in each type of case is that the mere
presence of the government as the grantor of the interest requires
48. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
49. See generally, Dwomniu, supra note 45, at 184-205.
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treatment of the entitlement as a property right, and any attempt
by the Court to strike a balance after the fact fails to recognize
this crucial factor. The principle of decisionmaking employed must
acknowledge that when these interests are established, they create
property-like interests that can exceed the procedural protections
provided by the legislatures. It is the responsibility of the Court to
guarantee that the lives of individual persons are not subject to
disruption by such legislative mistakes. The difficulty with use of
either the Mathews formula or the standard formulae for employ-
ment contracts is that their use begs the important question of
whether a property interest is at stake by permitting its value to be
discounted in order to achieve a reasonable cost balance with the
designated procedural protections."
If the due process clauses have any meaning for new property
interests, they must mean that individuals may order their lives
without any fear of arbitrary state action. If government agencies,
in implementing legislative programs, are to be prohibited from
acting like feudal landlords, then the property interests in employ-
ment and public assistance must be fully acknowledged by accord-
ing them full procedural protections. This, after all, was Reich's
point.
The problem of determining what interests there shall be-by
weighing all the costs, including the costs of normal procedural due
process protections, against the benefits of the interests, on the
scale of the public welfare-is a legislative task. Ensuring that leg-
islatures have not made mistakes, that could be harmful to indi-
viduals, in the way those interests are protected is a court task.
Part I of this article has been devoted to the second of these issues.
Part II will consider a different issue that should be raised and
resolved by legislatures when entitlements and employment op-
portunities are proposed and granted.
PART II: Civic FRIENDSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Introduction
The proposals regarding due process protections for public as-
sistance and public employment made in Part I of this paper may
seem unrealistic. Courts, it will be said, are not likely to order elab-
50. This appears to be exactly what occurs in Mathews. The Court discounts the obvi-
ous value of disability benefits and thus the grievousness of the loss by hypothesizing that it
is possible for a person eligible for disability benefits to have other sources of income be-
cause eligibility for such benefits is not based on financial need. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
340-41.
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orate protections for statutory entitlements, especially in contra-
vention of the expressed wishes of the legislatures. But this need
not be the case. Legislative bodies have and retain the power to
alter or eliminate programs in which employment and assistance
benefits are embedded if they do not like court-ordered procedural
protections. Moreover the courts, in mandating due process, are
not usurping legislative authority. The courts would only be re-
quiring that legislative programs which affect the rights of persons
be administered in an open, orderly, and honest fashion. Court-
ordered protections of the sort envisioned here are no doubt costly,
just as, for example, are the traditional due process protections
found in criminal law, but costs should not be a factor when the
state infringes on the rights of individual persons.
Consideration of the difficult problems raised by the Supreme
Court's attempts to determine what procedural protections should
be afforded claims to government largess also raise deeper ques-
tions about the administrative state. As has been noted, the pri-
mary function of procedural due process, both prior to and after
the mid-1960s, was clear. Procedural protections were recognized
as instrumental to the protection of the substantive rights of indi-
viduals.5' When, however, protections are sought for claims to gov-
ernment largess, additional new issues arise. Here, state action not
only has a direct effect on the lives of individuals, narrowly con-
ceived, it also has an impact upon the way in which individuals
carry out those parts of their lives that are shared with others. The
latter is an issue which will not fit the due process pattern of
protections.52
If fundamental constitutional rights tend to protect individu-
als as individuals from overzealous or arbitrary exercise of state
authority, then legislative programs tend to define both the extent
to which individuals cooperate with one another for mutual benefit
and the character of that cooperation. In liberal states, such as
ours,5 3 communal values have not been explicitly promoted as mat-
ters of government policy to the extent that individualistic values
like property, liberty, or equality have."' Indeed, when they have
been acknowledged at all, they have been seen as merely the hoped
for result of living in a democratically organized community gov-
51. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 501-06.
52. But see note 56 infra.
53. The term "liberal" here means non-orthodox states-states which do not pretend
to oversee the moral or religious development of their citizens, but which do provide an
opportunity for that development in proscriptions on state interference in its citizens' lives.
The law in a liberal state is said to "rest lightly on men."
54. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE, 105 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RAWLS].
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erned by principles of fair play.55 As indicated in Part I, however,
changes in the role which the modern state plays in the lives of
persons make the issue of providing proper administrative adjudi-
cation particularly important and difficult. But exclusive reliance
upon the due process ideal to treat the problems of governmental
action in the administrative state may deceive us into thinking
that the only important issue in the administration of government
largess is the protection of individual interests. This will very
likely lead to a failure to take account of important communal val-
ues often associated with shared enterprises."' The remainder of
this article is an attempt to delineate some of these communal val-
ues and to suggest very briefly how they might be better protected
by legislative and administrative activities.
Communal Values in the Administrative State-A Problem of
Size and Sensitivity
When Tel~makhos visits Pylos and Lakedaimon, he discovers
more than merely information about his father. He also is intro-
duced to his father's friends and to the civic friendship they
shared. Tel6makhos is treated with the individual respect due him
as a member of this community. More importantly, he is also able
to see himself as belonging to a community that shares certain val-
ues and counts its members as worthy of care and concern.
Tel~makhos's spirit is renewed, his sense of his own worth is
heightened, and his capacity to carry on his own life and his life
shared with the Akhaians is revitalized.
In constitutional liberal democracies, two elements have tradi-
tionally been recognized as essential to the realization of this kind
of civic friendship. First, the basic structure of society must assure
individuals that they will be treated with equal respect, i.e., that
none are made mere instruments of the general welfare. Institu-
tionally, it is fundamental constitutional rights, such as due pro-
cess and equal protection, to which liberal states have looked in an
55. But see id.
56. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, XVIII
Nomos 126 (1977), notes that "explanatory procedures of the type broadly connoted. by 'due
process' [might] serve non-formal (communal, interpersonal) as well as formal (possessive,
privatistic) aims." Id. at 128. He appears skeptical, however, in his review of the Roth deci-
sion, about whether the Court would be willing to order due process for its "intrinsically
valued interchange" without some entitlement to protect. Id. at 148. The view that due
process might serve social goals other than the protection of private interests, or in fact does
serve them if incidentally, is also discussed in TR=, supra note 3, at 501-06. See also Sum-
mers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for Process Values, 60 CORNEUL
L. REv., passim (1974).
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attempt to guarantee this kind of respect. Second, society must in-
sure that shared enterprises are initiated only by democratic legis-
lative processes which, so the traditional view holds, assure that
cooperative programs are beneficial to both individuals themselves
and to their sense of being engaged in a genuinely cooperative
enterprise.'5
But the kind of civic friendship of which Tel~makhos is the
beneficiary cannot very easily be guaranteed, or even approached,
by democratic processes in the modern welfare state. Indeed, as
our own society has become larger and more complex and legisla-
tive programs have become increasingly important to individuals,
the general social atmosphere, which is supposed to sponsor mu-
tual trust and cooperation, has tended to dissipate."' The concern
for others, as expressed in government assistance programs, has
become harder to articulate clearly." In some instances so much
attention has been devoted to the success of legislative pro-
grams-to correct decisions with respect to the ends of such pro-
grams-that decent treatment of those who ostensibly benefit from
them has been forgotten. It is not surprising then that citizens gen-
erally mistrust government programs. They doubt their effective-
ness, participate in them only half-heartedly and cynically, and ac-
cept their benefits ungraciously and ungratefully.60
Promoting Civic Friendship
What, then, can be done to promote that genuine trust and
concern necessary to civic friendship? Consider for a moment the
kinds of activities in which communal values are most likely to be
present: A Sunday afternoon game of basketball among neighbors,
a mountain climbing expedition or fishing trip with friends, the op-
eration of an academic department, indeed the running of any sort
of close business or recreational enterprise will do. It is clear, on
even a moment's reflection, that merely participating in such en-
57. This idea is expressed by RAwLs, supra note 54, at 523:
When men are secure in the enjoyment of the exercise of their own powers, they
are disposed to appreciate the perfections of others, especially when their several
excellences have an agreed place in a form of life the aims of which all accept.
58. See generally Rosow, Human Dignity in the Public-Sector Workplace, 45 VrrAL
SPEECHES 166 (Jan. 1, 1979) (discusses the decline of government employees' morale as a
function of the low state of public confidence in government generally).
59. See generally Lenkowsky, Welfare Reform and the Liberals, 67 COMMENTARY 56
(March, 1979) (discusses the difficulty of defining a liberal view of welfare reform).
60. See generally Lemann, Anti-Social Security, 9 WASH. MONTHLY 38 (January,
1978) (discusses how government employees avoided being brought in under the Social Se-
curity program).
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terprises when fair rules are present is not enough. To promote a
full sense of civic friendship, what also is required is that the activ-
ity be conducted in such a way that the talents and interests, in-
deed the general well-being of each of those who engage in it, are
seriously considered by everyone as a very part of the way the ac-
tivity is conducted. Enterprises which are operated in this way per-
mit each person to find him or herself a constructive part of the
activity and a contributor to the effort to make sure that others
also have constructive roles to play. Tel6makhos does not have to
invoke his status as Odysseus's son to receive decent hospitable
treatment at the hands of the Akhaians. He merely presents him-
self as a member of the community and automatically receives
such treatment. Because of this, his sense of his worth as a human
being is assured, and his sense of his community's concern and
support is also guaranteed. He is no longer alone in the world, and
the world is no longer as hostile as it had seemed when he was at
home amidst his mother's suitors.
If the ideals of civic friendship are to be realized, the basic
legislative and administrative programs of a complex, modern soci-
ety must be conducted differently from the way they are operated
now. They must be run so as to promote more fruitful participa-
tion by those individuals who must share in government activities.
Ordinary citizens must have an opportunity for more extensive
participation in the formulation of the principles which govern
their shared activities, and fuller participation in, and explanation
of, the operation of these activities once conceived, especially as
the enterprises affect their particular lives. How this might be
achieved in its details obviously cannot be presented here. But
some examples of the kind and magnitude of change necessary can
be suggested.
Program Formulation:
When programs are formulated, altered, or funded, legislative
committees and administrative agencies ought to attempt to un-
derstand not only the purpose of the proposed program but also
how its administration will affect both the lives of the benefi-
ciaries and of those who administer the benefits. This means that
legislative committees and agencies must hear as often from those
directly affected by their programs and from those lower level
government employees who actually implement these programs as
they do from agency heads or administrators. This might mean,
in agencies, for example, that administrative staff members, even
at the lowest levels, are brought into policy formulating activities.
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Program Implementation:
As programs are implemented, government employees ought
to be held to the highest standards of civic friendship. They need
to understand why programs are designed as they are, what role
they are playing in the overall design, and how essential their role
is to maintain high standards of individual respect in program
implementation. Extensive employee participation in the
processes which determine the details of program implementation
will undoubtedly help engender such service and should, there-
fore, be widespread. Systems of reward for imaginative treatment
of difficult social situations might also be instituted. Most impor-
tantly, though, values of civic friendship such as decency and con-
cern must be acknowledged as essential in the processes of imple-
mentation of government programs and not as peripheral to
program goals.
Program Adjudication:
Complaints from program recipients and program employees
must be treated carefully and efficiently. The requirements of due
process as outlined in Part I obviously must be satisfied but, ad-
ditionally, adjudicative processes must seek sensible compromises
and must create, so far as possible, a sense of common interests
among disputing parties. This might mean, for example, that citi-
zen advisory committees should be more widely used to settle dis-
putes between government agencies and private citizens.
From the examples offered above, it should be clear that the
implications of what is being proposed here are substantial and far
reaching. If legislators and administrators were held to high stan-
dards in providing for participation and explanation, then cost
alone would probably dictate that there be far fewer government
programs. But, what programs there were would be required actu-
ally to promote, not discourage, civic friendship. Much of the
alienation from government now widely experienced reflects both a
sense that costly legislative programs are simply irrelevant to peo-
ples' actual lives and a sense that such programs may very well be
disruptive of values of communal goodwill that we, like
Tel6makhos, need to fulfill our lives.
Conclusion
.It is not surprising that legislatures, in creating programs,
have not focused on these issues. We have no long-standing tradi-
tions that make the bonds of civic friendship an explicit part of
our collective government action. This is so partly because collec-
tive government action of sufficient size to affect our communal
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relations is a relatively new phenomenon-probably less than 40
years old. Moreover, the costs of participation and consultation are
very high, and legislatures often seek to achieve results by the least
costly route. This discounts the cost to the general welfare of ac-
cording insufficient attention to the way people see their lives in
relation to one another and to government. Obviously, the quality
and quantity of participation and explanation must be geared to
the civic friendship expected. Ignored, ill-conceived, or improperly
oriented processes of participation may be a positive detriment to
the realization not only of the goals of an enterprise but also to
communal values whose importance is independent of an enter-
prise's explicit goals. Only when individuals can recognize that the
enterprises they share are mutually beneficial can the values of
civic friendship be realized.
What is being suggested here is that the issues which have
been raised by the administrative due process cases beginning with
Goldberg are merely symptomatic of larger difficulties in the oper-
ation of our state. Sympathy for the rights of litigants like Roth,
Eldridge, and Bishop gains its customary legal expression in con-
cern with whether due process has been afforded. Here there is
state action. Here there are individuals allegedly wronged by state
action. The plain words of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
make due process instrumental to the protection of independently
defined individual rights. Our sympathy for these litigants, how-
ever, should extend beyond their individual rights. We sense that
the decent, civil thing has not been done; they have not told their
stories to responsive ears. They have been treated with little sense
of community concern. We often forget that along with liberty and
equality comes fraternity, and that, without fraternity, rights to
liberty and property become grudging limitations upon govern-
mental activities rather than genuine expressions of persons' worth
in society.
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